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                     ABSTRACT 
 
 
In this work the properties of  minority games  containing agents which try to winning  all 
the time are studied by means of computational simulations. We have considered several 
ways of  introducing above the rules clever  players using  strategies  which try to outdo 
the others endowed with statistically equivalent strategies and compared the resulting 
behaviours of the ensemble. It is shown that by introducing  such agents the overall 
performance of the system gets significantly poorer. While the introduction of a  very small 
fraction of these never-loosing-players may not destroys the unordered / ordered phase 
transition of the standard minority game we find that even for a  low concentration of their 
presence only a state worse  than random coin toss choices sets in. These special 
agents/players have the role of impurities or vacancies in spin systems and their presence 
may lead  to a critical concentration where the usual phases   are washed out.  
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The minority game (MG) is a very simple model of interacting agents. 
Nevertheless it shows fascinating properties and poses novel challenging 
questions to statistical mechanics and its methods and ideas. It is a very simple 
toy model for complex systems and may come to play the same role in science 
as the Ising model, applicable in many interdisciplinary subjects from physics 
to economy and biology to name a few. In short, its main idea is the 
following: an odd number of selfish players repeatedly has to choose one out 
of two possible actions. These could be for example buying or selling at the 
stock market, taking the bus or the metro, which internet router is the fastest 
(ie. less crowded). As it will become clearer in the examples, the players that 
are in the minority side will win the game. If there are more sellers than 
buyers, the price will fall and the buyers will be in advantage. If there are lots 
of people in the metro it would have been much more comfortable to take the 
bus and so on. This kind of game was inspired by Arthur's ``El Farol'' problem 
[1]. There it was an overcrowded bar that rose his interest of how a population 
of heterogeneous players interacts.  
 In this section we give a short and necessarily incomplete summary of 
the MG  and their well-known properties. Then we shall present our modified 
models  and compare them with the standard model. In the MG that was 
introduced in [2,3], N agents (or players) choose at each time step τ one out of 
two possible options, say 0 and 1. Agents that belong to the smaller of both 
groups win. They act completely independent, without any possibility of 
communication or interaction. Their only available information about the 
other player's actions is a ``history" (or ``memory'') of the last m games' 
winners. There are two possible values for each of the m entries of the history, 
so there are 2m possible different histories. Every player is equipped with a set 
of S strategies to determine their next choice. As the decision depends on the 
current history of the last games, these strategies contain 2m values, each of 
them representing the choice for one of the possible histories. All of the 2m 
entries can be 0 or 1, so there are m22 different strategies. After all agents 
having made their choice and the winning group being determined, the agents 
compare the predictions that their strategies made with the present outcome. If 
a strategy was right, it will be rewarded with one point. The agents will always 
use the best strategy, that means the one with the most points, to take their 
choice. An interesting quantity in the MG is the standard deviation 
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where R is the total number of rounds, )1(iN  is the number of agents playing 1 
(or 0) in round i. The standard deviation is a measure for the efficiency of the 
system at distributing the limited resources. ( )2 12 −≈ NN is the maximum number 
of points to be won per time step. Small variations around this value mean 
therefore, that the system is very efficient. Fig.1 shows our results for two 
different values of N. 
Numerical simulations as fig.1 or in [4], as well as analytical 
calculations [5] show that the system undergoes a phase transition. The two 
phases are separated by the minimum of the curve. On the left side of the 
minimum we observe that the value of σ varies widely from the medium 
value, whereas on the right side these variations vanish almost completely. In 
[6] it is shown that all the curves for different values of N and m fall on a 
universal curve by using a N/2σ  vs. Nm /2  plot, see fig.2. For large values of 
the ratio Nm /2=α  the system displays a cooperative phase ( 34.0≈> cαα ), for 
small values ( cαα < ) the coordination of the agents is worse than the one of a 
``random system``. The ``random system'' consists of agents that make their 
choice by coin toss, without using any strategy.  
These general properties do not depend on the number of available 
strategies S that the agents can use. This is shown in fig.3 for S=4.      
In fig.4 we directly compare the performances of two ensembles with S=2 and 
S=4. There we see that four strategies are less efficient than two strategies, as 
it is explained in [6]. Only for larger values of m (almost random choice) the 
results are the same. 
 Among many of possible generalizations the standard minority game 
with two choices can be generalized to more than just two options [7]. In fact 
life would be kind of sad, if there always were only two options to choose 
from. The qualitative behaviour remains the same as it is for two choices. 
Only the value αc where the phase transition occurs depends on the number of 
choices. Here we undertake a generalization which focuses on the effects on 
the system of interacting heterogeneous agents when privileged agents take 
out part of the generated resources available to the honest players. There are 
many ways of trying to do so and in the next section we  present some of 
them.and its effects, notably the suppression of the ordered / disordered  phase 
transition if the population of the above-the-rules players is higher than a 
given threshold. In terms of spins systems  [6], these agents play the role of 
impurities or vacancies and their presence naturally lead to a concentration 
threshold or impurity concentration limits where order / disorder phase 
transition  is washed out. 
So  agents which get above the average rewards no matter the global 
state of the system may seems a  common place . The method for achieving 
this goal may vary from  naturally inherited better strategies to breaking the 
rules. We wanted to introduce this idea in the minority game, specially the 
latter case, and analysed several different ways of doing so: 
 
M1:  in addition to N  agents  equipped with S normal strategies like in the 
standard MG there are k agents which always join  the winning (minority) side 
thus sharing the rewards. A penalty is introduced : if the total number of the 
agents sharing the points in a run exceeds the available resources, they 
become loosers. 
 In figure 4 it is shown the standard deviation vs. memory for this model 
for k=0, 4, 6, and 10 which for the number of agents considered is 
approximately the percentage of  clever  agents in the system. Clearly the 
overall performance of the adaptive system becomes worse as soon as k is 
different from zero. By depriving the normal players of their reward the extra 
agents increase the fluctuations in the number of agents in the minority side 
thus favoring  higher fluctuations and this happens for any concentration  of 
the extra players for model M1. At about 10% of their presence the averaged 
standard fluctuation is always above the random coin tossing case (horizontal 
line in the graph) and there is no longer a optimum distribution  (minima for 
sigma). 
 
 M2:  in addition to agents  equipped with S normal strategies like in the 
standard MG there are k agents which always join  the winning (minority) side  
sharing evenly with them the rewards for that run. 
In figure 5 it is shown the standard deviation vs. memory for this model 
for k=0, 5,10 and 20. Clearly the overall performance of the adaptive system is 
again worse as soon as k is different from zero and again depriving the normal 
players of their full reward, the extra agents increase the fluctuations in the 
number of agents in the minority side thus favouring  higher fluctuations ,i.e., 
a large spread in σ, and this happens for any concentration  of the extra 
players for model M2.  In this case  for low memories their presence may 
improves somewhat the performance (which always a bad one)  but at high 
memory values for all k considered the system performs worse than the 
random coin case. 
In figure 6 it is shown the utility function ( a measure of the 
effectiveness of the system in distributing resources [9] ) for the above two 
models. Again, both models have their performance decreased when 
compared with the standard MG model.     
  
Metc..:  in addition to agents  equipped with S normal strategies like in the 
standard MG there are k agents which always join  the winning (minority) side 
and they exclude for rewarding the k  poorest performers up to that time 
among the winners; or they look like normal agents if their strategies win 
rewards otherwise they change the reward assignment; or etc There is an 
infinity of ways of implementing above-the-rules agents as well as 
complexing the model by introducing evolutionary agents and penalties. 
However, the above two simple models should illustrate the point that in these 
adaptive systems agents breaking the rules of the majority do so at the 
expenses of decreasing the overall performance.  
 
 In conclusion, the effect of introducing agents which somehow gets a 
share of the resources available, no matter how, seems to worsen the system 
resources distribution and effectiveness. Looking around, most of the time, 
this should come with no surprise. What may be wonderful is that by studying 
a very simple toy model, amenable to analytical study [5,6], it arises the 
possibility of quantifying the effects of such agents either by numerical 
simulations  (experiments) or analytically which we leave for  future works. 
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            FIG. 1: SMG; σ vs m ; S = 2;averages over 100 realizations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               FIG. 2: SMG; σ2 / N vs 2m / N ; S = 2; averages over 100 realizations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           FIG. 3: SMG; σ2 / N vs 2m / N ; S = 4 averages over 100 realizations; 
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FIG. 4: MG; σ vs m ; N=101 , S = 2; model  M1; averages over 200 
realizations 
 2 4 6 8 10 12
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
k = 20
k = 10
k = 5
k = 0
 
 
 B
 D
 F
 H
si
gm
a
memory
                            
FIG. 5: MG; σ vs m ; N=101 , S = 2; model  M2; averages over                     
200  realizations 
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  FIG. 6: MG; utility function vs time; N=101 , S = 2, 
                                        m=8; averages over  200  realizations 
 
